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M
ore than a decade after the implosion of the 
CPSU leadership (i.e., the Soviet system) 
the Western-style, free market Russia that 
many in the West desired has yet to appear. As the 
principal successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia 
currently resides in the twilight zone of both being 
ally and rival to the West, evolving as a complex 
political hybrid that defies precise categorization. It 
has also defied Western (predominantly American) 
attempts to assign it the role of quiescent and 
cooperative junior partner in Bush the Elder’s “new 
world order.” Of course, as Jeffrey Surovell argues 
throughout his provocative monograph, Capitalist 
Russia and the West, the days of superpower parity 
are long gone. Indeed, Surovell captures an 
important aspect of the new status quo, 
demonstrating throughout his treatise that Russia’s 
dependency on the West “is not a totally 
harmonious, smooth, and mutually coordinated 
affair, but entails bargaining for advantage, give- 
and-take, even threat among the various parties.”1 
This is reflected clearly by a recent statement in 
which President Putin emphasized “that Russia must 
learn to protect its position in a world characterized
by extremely cruel competition, especially 
economically. Russia has no special claims in the 
world, but insists upon treatment commensurate with 
i s history, potential and enormous size.2 Capitalist 
Russia and the West comprises a thorough (indeed, 
year by year) accounting of Russia’s slide from a 
power broker of highly heralded summits to the 
pawnbroker for conventional weapons and nuclear 
technology. The point of departure for Surovell’s 
take on Russia is a deep grounding in dependency 
theory as well as class-based (mainly Marxist) 
approaches to politics and society. This leads to an 
inevitable stress on economic issues, both on the 
domestic and international levels. This is both a 
strength and a weakness, as Surovell endeavors to 
explain the post-Communist incarnation of Russia’s 
social order in terms of the enduring struggle of 
international capital and labor.
Surovell’s reliance on such extrinsic factors 
perhaps undervalues the self-destructive, reactionary 
impulses of Russian society that fuel the many 
conspiracy theorists in the Russian Federation who 
blame America for dragging it down. Despite the 
international sympathy following the events of
1. Surovell, Capitalist Russia and the West, p. 280. 2. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 110, part 1, 13 June 2002.
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September 11, anti-Americanism in Russia 
intensified, mainly due to Russian perceptions of the 
widening military and economic gap between the 
two countries. According to a poll conducted by the 
All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion 
(VTsIOM) in March 2002, only 17 percent of 
Russians see the United States as a friendly state, 
while 71 percent held the opposite view. This was a 
sharp increase over the agency's 2001 poll on the 
same topic, in which only 44 percent felt the U.S. 
not to be a friend. The main reasons for increased 
anti-American sentiment were suspicions about 
NATO and Russia's failures in the Winter Olympic 
Games. Only 7 percent were willing to take the 
U.S. side in conflicts with Iraq, Iran, or Syria, while 
20 percent feel that Russia should side with those 
countries.3 Meanwhile, influential journalists and 
intellectuals have developed the habit of asserting 
their country's “decisive edge” over the U.S. in 
terms of culture and morals (loudly and publicly), 
haranguing the U.S. for its attempts to subvert 
Russian culture and values, and denouncing America 
for its “black ingratitude”—an oft-used term in the 
Russian media.4 Even President Putin has engaged in 
cultural one-upmanship, dragging the Bushes 
through a crash course in Russian high culture 
during their visit to St. Petersburg. The nightly news 
on Russia’s NTV “showed Putin's surprised look 
when President Bush took out his chewing gum 
while marveling at the decorations in the Kremlin.”5 
Of course, rather than cultural one-upmanship this 
might simply be Putin’s revenge for having to spend 
time at the presidential ranch in Crawford, Texas, in 
November 2001.
Such cultural exchanges aside, Russian 
perceptions of American culpability for their 
misfortunes remains problematic. This was 
particularly the case regarding instances such as the 
much-ballyhooed ice-skating controversy, and the 
disqualification of Russian athletes for alleged use of 
banned substances. The hysteria began when the 
figure skating results were revised and Russian 
skiers were removed from the competition on doping
allegations. During the February 2002 Winter 
Olympics even the mainstream Russian media 
coverage was awash in accusations that the US was 
somehow working behind the scenes to undermine 
Russian athletes: “a wave of anti-Americanism of 
unseen might literally inundated Russian TV.” Much 
of the Russian media pointed to an alleged 
conspiracy to humiliate Russia at the Olympics, 
charging that the U.S. ran the Games for its own 
benefit. So-called “anonymous forces” in the US 
supposedly bribed judges, shamelessly “stole medals 
from Russia,” and fabricated doping charges against 
“innocent” Russian athletes, “literally sucking extra 
blood from them for unnecessary tests.”6
Perhaps what is most striking about the 
“Olympic hysteria” was that it was fanned by 
Russian political officials at the highest levels, 
including Putin (who later backtracked) and 
members of the State Duma, who passed a resolution 
condemning the treatment of Russia and called for a 
boycott of the Games. This was followed by another 
round of hysterical anti-American propaganda, this 
time centered upon the bankruptcy of the famous 
Victor Kamkin Russian bookstore in New York 
City. Because no one had wanted to buy the two 
million Russian texts remaining in the store's 
inventory, the idea of simply destroying the books 
had been suggested. The Russian media seized upon 
the circumstances of the bankruptcy, as an attack on 
Russian culture: some deliberate American policy of 
burning Russian books.7 Because media outlets 
throughout the Russian Federation receive some 
measure of government subsidy and/or have outside 
sponsors or private owners with political 
connections, editorial independence has been 
increasingly threatened. Officials exert political 
pressure, both at the national and regional levels, and 
with major media outlets increasingly controlled by 
big financial groups, media outlets inevitably reflect 
their political biases and the battles of the business 
concerns that control them. Freedom House’s annual 
Survey of Press Freedom has consistently rated 
Russia “Partly Free” since 1992. Continued assaults
3. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Volume 6, No. 46, Part I, 11 March 2002. 
The poll was conducted among 1,500 respondents in 44 regions 
of Russia.
4. Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti- 
Americanism after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” 
Johnson's Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
5. Peter Rutland, “Putin’s Levitation Act,” Russia and Eurasia
Review, Volume 1, no. 1,4 June 2002, Jamestown Foundation.
6. For a treatment of the anti-American tenor of the Russian 
media, particularly regarding the 2002 Winter Olympics, see 
Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti-Americanism 
after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” Johnson's 
Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
7. Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti-Americanism 
after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” Johnson's 
Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
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upon the independence of media outlets have 
seriously eroded even this meager standard. Those 
media outlets that offer alternative viewpoints and 
analysis quickly fmd themselves facing substantial 
legal and financial obstacles. Journalists and media 
owners critical of the Putin regime come under 
intense scrutiny, including arbitrary audits, 
complicated legal battles, and occasionally even 
beatings (always by “unknown assailants”).8
This state of affairs, however, has not 
engendered significant political or social protest: 
something difficult for many of us diehard “First 
Amendment” advocates to fathom. Most Russians 
seem relatively comfortable with “the media as a 
political player, rather than as an unbiased watchdog 
or commentator on political life.” In fact, they even 
“expect television to instill a sense of pride about the 
country and find news coverage of Chechnya, 
corruption, crime, and other problems depressing 
and unpatriotic.”9 As Georgy Bovt points out, from 
about 1985 to 1992 media outlets (especially the 
press) enjoyed ever-expanding audiences and newly- 
found prestige. However, the period of market 
reforms brought with it increased production costs 
and more competition. Prices rose as incomes fell, 
opening up media outlets to a new set of commercial 
and political vulnerabilities. Moreover, the 1990s 
witnessed a sharp veering toward unprofessional, 
exploitative, and corrupt trends in journalism (a 
pattern not unknown in the West), further alienating 
the Russian public.10 Journalists are generally seen 
by the public as little more than the front men for the 
media tycoons who looted the country’s assets, 
building vast fortunes and patronage networks. Thus, 
they enjoy little sympathy or respect from the tens of 
millions who live at or near the poverty line. Indeed, 
the type of journalism upon which their media 
empires were built leaves a great deal to be desired. 
Moreover, business firms and other self-interested 
parties are able to procure almost any story they 
want on Russian television by resorting to bribes. Of 
course, there are many sincere, independent, hard-
working journalists in Russia, even among the
8. See my chapter in Nations in Transit on the political, 
economic, and social developments in Russia during 2001, 
published by Freedom House (Summer 2002).
9. Sarah Oates’ chapter on “Politics and the Media,” in White, 
Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, 
p. 266.
10. Georgy Bovt, “The Russian Press and Civil Society,” in 
Marsh and Gvosdev, eds., Civil Society and the Search for Justice 
in Russia, pp. 97-98.
entities mentioned above, but their efforts are 
overshadowed and undermined by the manipulation 
of speech freedoms by both the government and its 
political rivals.11
Thus, it was likely a combination of factors, such 
as a desire to regain its appeal to a wide audience via 
patriotic themes, an inability to accept the fact of (or 
responsibility for) the decline of Russia’s once 
internationally dominant athletic program, and one 
suspects political influence and opportunism, that 
yielded this past spring’s virulent anti-Western 
(mainly anti-American) turn in the Russian press. 
Indeed, in a succinct chapter that deals with many of 
the myriad problems and temptations dogging the 
Russian media, Brad Owens strikes a somewhat 
more optimistic note regarding the trajectories and 
potential development of the fourth estate in the 
Russian Federation. He feels that “Russian 
journalists are beginning to come to terms with the 
high costs of ‘selling out’ to economic interests with 
political agendas.”12 Moreover, some journalists did 
resist the temptation to interpret Russia's lackluster 
Olympic performance as a triumph of America’s 
principal foreign policy agenda; the continued 
subjugation and humiliation of great Russia. 
Curiously, factors such as the rampant corruption 
endemic in Russia’s sports agencies, the lack of 
proper training facilities, and the pitiful 
underfunding by the government of aspiring athletes, 
were rarely cited as contributing elements to 
Russia’s disappointing Olympic performance. 
Perhaps the phrase used by Russian journalist Irina 
Petrovskaya to describe the situation fits best: 
“Patriotism is the last refuge for a bad dancer.”13
But while holding the line against imperialism’s 
underhanded designs to weaken Mother Russia 
might be the preferred hobbyhorse of some portion 
of the leadership elite, the Russian foreign policy 
course entails a wider array of factors and actors. 
Alex Pravda’s chapter on foreign policy in 
Developments in Russian Politics attempts to sort 
out the often incoherent and ambivalent post- 
Communist foreign policy trends of the former 
Superpower. Pravda, long one of the most astute
11. Editorial, “Free Media, Free of Crooks,” The Russia Journal, 
issue 35 (78), 9 September 2000.
12. Brad Owens, “The Independent Press in Russia: Integrity and 
the Economics of Survival,” in Marsh and Gvosdev, eds., Civil 
Society and the Search for Justice in Russia, p. 110.
13. Cited in Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Rise of Russian Anti- 
Americanism after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor,” 
Johnson's Russia List, #6227, 7 May 2002.
17
Th e  Ha r r ima n  Re v ie w
observers of the Russian foreign policy scene, 
analyzes Russian trends and actions in terms of 
policy towards the “near abroad” (i.e., the former 
Soviet republics) versus policy towards the “far 
abroad.” Russian policies concerning the near 
abroad have in essence lacked requisite drive and 
effectiveness, and their overall weakness can be 
traced “to a combination of complacency, unclear 
roles and institutional ambiguities... neither simply a 
policy of aggressive neo-imperialism nor one of 
liberal cooperation.”14 For example, despite lingering 
antipathy toward their “Baltic brothers,” for their 
alleged abuse of ethnic Russians,15 the Russian 
diaspora in the FSU has never been a priority in 
Russian foreign policy. Early rumblings about 
“protecting Russians in Latvia and Estonia from 
human rights violations” yielded to tacit 
acknowledgment that ethnic Russians living in the 
Baltics states enjoy higher living standards than 
most citizens of the Russian Federation.16
Moreover, any talk of obstructing Baltic efforts 
to join the EU and NATO is no longer taken 
seriously. The same can likely be said of any real 
Russia-Belarus Union. As Surovell notes in his 
critique of Russia’s abdication of a strong CIS, there 
has been a distinct slowdown in the Belarus-Russia 
rapprochement that had been pushed by Yeltsin, 
particularly a reticence to establish anything 
meaningful in terms of economic integration or 
supranational political bodies.17 In June 2002 Putin 
was vocal in his criticism of proposals presented by 
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka 
concerning integration of the two countries, accusing 
Belarus of trying to recreate the USSR on the basis 
of Russia's economic might, emphasizing that the 
Belarussian economy equals just 3 percent of
14. Alex Pravda’s chapter on “Foreign Policy,” in White, Pravda, 
and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, pp. 216, 
218.
15. A poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology and reported 
by The St. Petersburg Times on 4 September 2001 found that 
20% of the residents of the northern capital view Estonia and 
Lithuania as enemies of Russia, and that 25% have that opinion of 
Latvia. Outside the city, in Leningrad Oblast, the poll found, 
those figures were even higher. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 5, no.
170, part 1, 7 September 2001.
16. For example, the Latvian magazine Klubs, which regularly 
publishes lists of the country’s wealthiest people, reports that 
nearly half of Latvia's some 100 millionaires are Russian 
speakers. Valentinas Mite, “Latvia: Russian Speakers Hold Their 
Own On The Business Front,” RFE/RL Report, Prague, 17 May 
2002.
17. Surovell, Capitalist Russia and the West, p. 258.
Russia's. He also rejected what he termed a 
“supranational organ with undefined functions,” 
effectively setting aside proposals that were largely 
endorsed in the past by former President Boris 
Yeltsin.18
Indeed, it is the Caucasus and Central Asia that 
have most bedeviled Russian policy-makers. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union left the rump federation 
with large sections of undefended frontiers and 
neighbors too weak to secure the previously well- 
fortified Soviet borders; moreover, the new 
governments of the southern tier of the FSU have 
had difficulty quelling local conflicts and combating 
extremist influences. Moscow has alternately 
attempted harder (interventionist) and softer, more 
even-handed tactics in dealing with this portion of 
the near abroad. Recent events have again raised the 
possibility of military intervention to neutralize the 
threat posed by the presence of militants in 
Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, often a staging ground for 
extremist elements who operate in Chechnya. In any 
event, the costs of security have not been 
unsubstantial, and “Russia has had to bear the cost 
of security for the benefits of exercising control.”19
Russian policy regarding the far abroad has also 
traversed a complex path of twists and turns, with 
President Putin embarking on a less than popular 
pro-American stance in the wake of September 11th. 
While Putin’s course of cozying up to the West fits 
square with Jeffrey Surovell’s argument that post- 
Communist Russian leaders knuckle under to the 
dictates of capital (and hence capital’s military 
enforcer, the U.S.), the sudden turn did take some 
analysts by surprise. As Peter Rutland put it, “Putin 
talked the talk, but he also walked the walk, making 
a stream of hitherto unimaginable concessions.”20 
Russian acquiescence to the unilateral U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM treaty, to the stationing of 
American forces (and influence) into the FSU 
(especially Tajikistan and Georgia), to the expansion 
of NATO to include the Baltic states, not to mention 
the conduct of a war in neighboring (and former
18. See RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 111, part 1, 14 June 
2002; and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 118, part 1,25 June 
2002. For more on this, see Jan Maksymiuk, “A Union 
Fractured,” RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 114, part 1, 19 June 
2002.
19. Alex Pravda’s chapter on “Foreign Policy,” in White, Pravda, 
and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, pp. 222- 
223. The quote is on p. 223.
20. Peter Rutland, “Putin’s Levitation Act,” Russia and Eurasia 
Review, vol. 1, no. 1,4 June 2002, Jamestown Foundation.
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client) Afghanistan, certainly provides grist for those 
who argue that Russia is selling out to the West.
In fact, I would argue that given such a weak 
hand (due to Russia’s poor economic situation, lack 
of powerful allies, and the deterioration of its 
military establishment), the Russian President has 
done well. The long overdue shift from pretensions 
of a detente-era global superpower to a more tenable 
role as a European power better suit Russia’s 
capabilities, if not its nostalgic sensibilities. The 
replacement last year of Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev with Sergei Ivanov, a KGBist and close 
Putin ally, as well as the removal of General Leonid 
Ivashov as head of the Defense Ministry’s 
international department augurs well for such 
changes. Likewise, the naming of a (female!) 
civilian to oversee the army budget is a positive step. 
On the global scale, then, Russia simply cannot 
contend for parity with the U.S., but in specific 
regions (especially in the Caucasus and in Central 
Asia), Russia in fact can function as a senior partner 
to its Western allies. Indeed, an increasingly 
stretched U.S. military welcomes Russia’s help in 
such troublesome areas. Taking its cue from the 
positional shifts of the UK and France in the post- 
World War II years, Russia might be able to carve 
out a juicy role in the new world order, one based on 
such a notion of global cooperation and regional 
(though not international) parity between Russia and 
the United States.21
Of course the question of just how long Putin can 
keep up this pro-Western position in spite of the 
prevailing opinions in Russian society still remains. 
This is particularly true given the intractability of 
Russia’s domestic political scene. It is on issues 
relating to such themes that concerns the bulk of the 
works and authors reviewed here. A set of issues that 
perhaps bridges the gap between domestic and 
international policy spheres is the deteriorating state 
of the Russian military and the (not unrelated) war in 
Chechnya. The post-Communist Russian military, as 
Zoltan Barany illustrates in his effective chapter- 
length study, has become “a weak, disorganized 
institution marked by low morale and pitiful material
21. On this notion of regional parity, see Nikolai Zlobin, “Being a 
junior partner to the US is not demeaning: Russia just needs to 
understand where its interests coincide with American interests,” 
World Energy Policy Journal, #4, June 2002 <www.wep.ru> 
Available on Johnson‘s Russia List, #6317,20 June, 2002.
conditions.”22 The rank and file had never 
understood what was expected of them in the era of 
glasnost and perestroika-, and the vacillations and 
indecision of Gorbachev’s policies and the clear 
defeat in Afghanistan cost the military establishment 
its prestige, privileges and political clout. The 
Yeltsin era meant further unpredictability and 
disorientation for the military, as organizational 
shifts and informal political power arrangements 
combined with budgetary cuts to enfeeble the once 
mighty military-industrial complex. This trend was 
exacerbated by another disastrous war in Chechnya 
(1994-96) and Yeltsin’s divide et imperia strategy of 
creating multiple military establishments, which vied 
for both funds and power.23 Military life under Putin 
shows little improvement. Chief of the General Staff 
Anatoly Kvashnin reported on May 30, 2002, that 
“the situation in the Russian Army is worse than 
critical,” that the military is riddled by 
embezzlement and plunder, arguing that if radical 
measures are not taken “the declining level of its 
combat readiness may become irreversible.”24
Conscription rates have fallen precipitously 
while desertion rates and instances of corruption and 
abuse within the military have skyrocketed. The 
acting head of the General Staffs Organizational- 
Mobilization Department, Colonel General Vasily 
Smirnov, announced that only 11 percent of draftees 
called up in the course of the 2002 spring draft were 
suitable for the military service.25 In June, 
Prosecutor-General Ustinov, reported to the 
Federation Council that criminal investigations are 
under way concerning 19 senior military officers 
who “exceeded their authority, took possession of 
state property, or disposed improperly of state 
property.”26 At the lower end of the spectrum, 46 
percent of Russian soldiers live at or below the 
poverty line, and as of the third week of July 2002, 
about 1.2 million officers and soldiers still had not 
received their wages for June. According to one 
soldier quoted in the German daily Die Welt, “we
22. Zoltan Barany, “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in 
Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, p. 175.
23. Zoltan Barany, “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in 
Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, pp. 177, 186-187.
24. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 101, part 1,31 May 2002.
25. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 128, part 1, 11 July 2002. He 
also noted that 20% of draftees have only an elementary-school 
education and about 7% have criminal records.
26. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 111, part 1, 14 June 2002.
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live worse than homeless people, and this can't 
continue any longer.”27 The lack of funds seriously 
undermines current discussions about shifting the 
military to a professional-contract basis, a subject 
that continues to be bandied about. If Barany is 
correct in his findings that Russian military forces 
are characterized by poor training, insufficient 
maintenance of aging equipment, and unprofessional 
behavior, that conscripts (that is, those who don’t 
run away) are deployed for berry-picking, 
mushrooming and harvesting in order to procure 
sufficient food, and that “hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers must serve without proper uniforms, boots, 
and basic equipment,” I doubt that the best and the 
brightest will be likely to enlist in any future 
professional army.28
The current war in Chechnya merely exacerbates 
an already dire situation. Originally popular with a 
Russian public weary of continued terrorist acts, 
kidnapping, and lawlessness emanating from 
Chechnya, the war grinds on, albeit with decreasing 
support and seemingly no end in sight. In April 2002 
Putin was quoted as follows: “Regarding Chechnya, 
the military phase is over thanks to the bravery of 
the army and special task forces.”29 Perhaps he was 
studying films of General Westmoreland reassuring 
the American public about Vietnam before Tet 
(1968), since the resistance in Chechnya shows no 
signs of abating. In fact, this past summer Putin even 
named a new commander for the Joint Federal 
Forces in Chechnya, Lieutenant General Sergei 
Makarov. The new commander certainly has his 
work cut out for him. While performing far better 
than in the previous Chechen War, Russian forces 
have yet to see the light at the end of the tunnel. The 
Russian government compares its fight with 
separatist rebels to the U.S. war against terrorism in 
Afghanistan. Of course, the fact that Russian forces 
have been accused of repeated violations of human 
rights including murder, rape, theft, kidnapping and 
extortion make the comparison a stretch. 
Consequently, various journalists, representatives of 
human rights organizations, and international 
political leaders (e.g., recent comments by Mary 
Robinson and Joschka Fischer), continue to criticize 
Moscow for abuses committed by Russian forces.
27. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 136, part 1, 23 July 2002.
28. Zoltan Barany, “Politics and the Russian Armed Forces,” in 
Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges of 
Democratization, pp. 208, 211.
29. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 73, part 1, 18 April 2002.
Despite sagging enthusiasm for Putin’s 
Chechnya crusade, the Russian president retains 
widespread support. According to the latest 
(Summer 2002) VTsIOM poll, 73 percent of 
Russians approve of President Putin's performance, a 
figure that has changed little over the past two 
years.30 This is perhaps due to the dearth of 
alternatives, as no other figure enjoys significant 
national support. Christopher Marsh makes clear in 
his study of elections and voters in Russia that 
Russian democracy has yet to face a real “turnover 
test,” since Boris Yeltsin yielded the power to Putin, 
in a legal, but dubious scenario that disadvantaged 
an already fractured democratic-reformist elite and a 
Communist opposition still unable to transform 
social and economic deprivation into political 
control. Still, one must give credit where credit is 
due. Putin ran an outstanding campaign, avoiding 
televized debates and refusing to provide specific 
policy prescriptions, remaining “above politics,” and 
capitalizing on his role in executing the initial 
“revenge phase” of the Second Chechen War.31
Whether or not Russian democratization suffered 
as a result of the tainted presidential elections of 
1996 and 2000 remains to be seen, but Russia’s 
citizenry clearly supports the current president. 
Since the presidency was handed over to him at the 
beginning of 2000, Putin has shown himself at times 
to be a skillful politician, while at other times more 
the heavy-handed autocrat. As is clear from Robert 
Moser’s excellent review of the subject in Russian 
Politics, Putin’s popularity has allowed for a 
substantial change in the nature of executive- 
legislative relations in Russia. Consequently, 
Yeltsin’s political weakness in the final years of his 
tenure “was not institutionalized into a lasting 
redistribution of power between the executive and 
legislative branches.”32 * *In fact, it is in the treatment 
of the diverse areas that make up the wider 
framework of government that the authors under 
review here make their strongest contribution.
30. VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion) surveyed 1,600 people in 33 Russian regions. RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 144, part 1, 2 August 2002. For a critique 
of the methods and results of blatantly pro-Putin polling, see the 
article by Alexander Nadzharov in Novye Izvestia, 28 November 
2001.
31. Christopher Marsh, Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections, and 
Dernocratceatioti, pp. 111-118.
32. Robert Moser, “Executive-Legislative Relations in Russia,
1991-1999,” in Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics:
Challenges of Democratization, p. 97.
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Thomas Remington and Matthew Wyman’s chapters 
on legislative process and voters in Developments in 
Russian Politics provide valuable material to 
complement nicely both the Marsh book (mentioned 
above) and the analytical chapter by Michael 
McFaul of Russian electoral trends in the Barany 
and Moser volume.
A specific theme that permeates analyses of 
contemporary Russian society is the notion of the 
“rule of law,” which impacts the crucial areas of 
economic reform, crime and corruption, civil 
society, and the sense of justice. Russia’s 
constitution gives the president unusually strong 
powers, including the right to issue legally binding 
decrees and directives, as well as to appoint senior 
members of the judicial and executive branches. 
Presidential decrees and directives may, like other 
laws, be appealed to the Constitutional Court if held 
to violate the constitution. However, the Court does 
not have the right to select issues for consideration 
on its own initiative, and the range of those bodies 
that may submit issues to it is limited. Even when 
the Constitutional Court has made a ruling, no 
mechanism exists for enforcing the ruling. In 
general, court rulings do not constitute a source of 
legislation under the Russian legal system.33
Post-Communism has witnessed soaring rates of 
street crime plague Russian society, while organized 
crime groups operate with impunity. For example, 
carj ackers stole the $100,000 BMW used by the wife 
of Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov in broad daylight 
in St. Petersburg on July 31, 2002. The thieves 
allegedly sprayed mace in the face of the driver as he 
waited near Gryzlov's apartment and made off with 
the car.34 According to Louise Shelley, the criminal 
justice system reveals very selective enforcement of 
the law with most individuals arrested for crimes 
from the lowest economic and social levels of 
society.35 In many cases, however, the poorer 
defendants receive little in the way of useful legal 
assistance because funds are lacking to pay for trial 
attorneys and many public defenders are poorly
33. For example, Moscow’s Mayor Luzhkov has been able to 
ignore numerous rulings by the Constitutional Court which say by 
retaining the notorious Soviet-era propiska, or system of 
residence permits, his administration is violating Federation 
citizens’ constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of 
movement.
34. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 142, part 1,31 July 2002.
35. Louise Shelley’s chapter on “Crime and Corruption,” in 
White, Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian 
Politics 5, pp. 239, 243.
trained. In his thorough assessment of the 
development of a law-based state in the Russian 
Federation, Gordon Smith emphasizes that laws and 
codes are not sufficient for the rule of law to exist, 
that also necessary are sufficient funds, equipment, 
personnel, and other resources to function 
effectively.36 Herein lies much of the problem for 
post-Communist Russia. Overall, judicial 
independence in Russia is seriously threatened by 
the chronic lack of funding. Local courts have 
problems meeting their wage bills, buying 
equipment, paying telephone bills, and undertaking 
building repairs. This makes them easy targets for 
bribery and corruption.37 Some Union of Right 
Forces deputies in the Duma have called for 
extensive judicial-legal reform regarding current 
methods of financing the courts, as well as for large 
sums of money to be allotted to intensify and speed 
up judicial reform. Judges such as Sergei Pashin 
harbor strong doubts about the Kremlin's dedication 
to reforming the legal system, since, in the words of 
Pashin “the government's financial decisions so far 
show that legal reform is far from being a priority.”38 
As part of a major judicial reform, a new Criminal 
Procedure Code came into force on July 1, 2002, 
aimed at enhancing the rights of suspects by 
requiring warrants for searches and arrests. It also 
stipulates that a first interrogation of a suspect be 
held within 24 hours of detention, and that the 
suspect has the right to consultation with an attorney 
prior to it. The new code also attempts to give more 
power to defense attorneys by allowing them to 
conduct independent investigations of the case.39
While most analysts focus upon the institutions 
and laws necessary for the functioning of a market 
democracy in Russia, there is a conceptual element
36. Gordon Smith, “Russia and the Rule of Law," in White, . 
Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, 
pp. 222-223. The quote is on p. 112.
37. Judges frequently were paid bonuses by governors out of 
their regional budgets. For example, until last year Moscow 
Mayor Yury Luzhkov paid judges regular bonuses of$100- 
200/month to supplement their inadequate federal wages. Thus it 
is not surprising that while Luzhkov was providing the bonuses, 
he did not lose a single case he brought against newspapers that 
criticized him. Last fall, the Kremlin publicly criticized Luzhkov 
for this practice. Sophie Lambroschini, “Judge's Dismissal 
Underlines Problems Facing Russian Judiciary,” RFE/RL 
Newsline, Volume 4, No. 205, Part I, 23 October 2000.
38. Sophie Lambroschini, “Judge's Dismissal Underlines 
Problems Facing Russian Judiciary,” RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 4, 
no. 205, part 1, 23 October 2000.
39. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, vol. 6, no. 123, part 1, 2 July 2002.
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to the “rule of law” dilemma as well. Steven Fish 
stakes out a clearly American-centric view of 
Russian society, asserting that an overwhelming 
proportion of citizens do not regard subordinating 
themselves to the laws as obligatory or even 
desirable, and emphasizing their contempt for the 
mundane but crucial rules and laws that regulate 
daily life. “Just as state officials ignore citizens’ 
preferences, so too do citizens ignore the state’s 
dictates.” 40 Hence the argument made by Louise 
Shelley that “the pervasive corruption and the 
penetration of organized crime into the state and 
economy cannot be explained only by the failure to 
create institutions and norms.”41
After decades of a restrictive Communist order, a 
general societal contempt for law and for 
government should not have come as a surprise. This 
has been exacerbated by perceptions in Russia that 
market democracy, despite its great promises, has 
impoverished a once great society.
True, a small stratum of society has garnered 
great wealth, but the fruits of capitalism have yet to 
“trickle down” to the bulk of the population. 
Despite a recovering economy, Russian society 
remains divided between the very “haves” and the 
“have-nots.” The income gap in Russia reached 
levels of disparity characteristic of many African 
countries, while life expectancy fell so precipitously 
that Russia now ranks 60th in the world, according 
to UN statistics.42 Perhaps the market system itself is 
less to blame than those who were responsible for its 
implementation. This includes both Russian and 
Western policy-makers and advisers. In an excellent 
critique of the course of economic reform in the 
1990s, Yoshiko Herrera convincingly shows how 
both advisers and reformers failed to approach 
economic reform with a proper appreciation of the 
complexity of markets, that is, as they actually exist 
in capitalist economies. In Herrera’s words, “the 
superior ability of markets in handling economic 
problems was not replicated in the post-socialist 
Russian context simply by the quick transfer of 
outdated, but ideologically appealing, metaphors.”43
40. M. Steven Fish, “Conclusion: Democracy and Russian 
Politics,” in Barany and Moser, eds., Russian Politics: Challenges 
of Democratization, p. 225.
41. Louise Shelley, “Crime and Corruption,” in White, Pravda, 
and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, p. 245.
42. See the article by Stanislav Kondrashov in Vremya MN on 3 
August 2002.
43. Yoshiko Herrera, “Russian Economic Reform,” in Barany and 
Moser, eds., Russian Politics, p. 164.
Herrera goes on to explain that the lack of effective 
regulations and institutions necessary for monitoring 
the market have contributed greatly to two of 
Russia’s most intractable current problems, 
widening income inequality and criminalization on a 
massive scale.44
Crime, corruption, and the mafiazation of the 
economy are now associated, and tacitly accepted, as 
part and parcel of the free market system. The per 
capita murder rate has doubled since 1990 and is the 
highest in the world, three times more than the U.S. 
and four times more than France.4S Corruption and 
extortion pervade everyday life in Russia; people 
routinely pay bribes in order to conduct their affairs, 
and government officials routinely accept and even 
demand them.46 Ordinary people are required to pay 
bribes to get a bed in a hospital, to obtain proper 
medicine or an operation, to get a passport or 
driver’s license or to register one’s place of 
residence. Recent surveys show that 75 percent of all 
Russian officials take bribes, but only 0.4 percent of 
them are punished in any way.47 In an April 2002 
report, Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov sharply 
criticized law enforcement agencies and especially 
the Interior Ministry (MVD) for ineptness in 
combating corruption. The report states that while 
the MVD knows about widespread corruption 
among state officials, including holders of the 
highest offices, most anticorruption investigations 
deal only with lower-level corruption.48 As the 
President of the INDEM Center for Applied Political 
Studies Georgy Satarov points out, “Corruption is 
not just an ethical problem or a criminal one....it is 
above all a problem of the ineffectiveness of 
government.”49 * *
On the positive side of the ledger, the wild 
capitalism of the 1990s that allowed the 
redistribution of hundreds of billions worth of 
property through controversial, and blatantly unfair, 
privatization deals, has essentially ended, and
44. Yoshiko Herrera, “Russian Economic Reform,” in Barany and 
Moser, eds., Russian Politics, pp. 141, 161, 164.
45. John O'Mahony, The Guardian (GR), 3 February 2001.
46. See for example, Jeremy Bransten, “Russia: Corruption 
Continues To Thrive, Say Researchers,” RFE/RL Report, Prague, 
4 June 2002.
47. Kommersant-Vlast, 30 October 2001.
48. See Roman Kupchinsky, “Crime in Russia: 2001,” Crime, 
Corruption & Terrorism Watch, 9 May 2002, vol. 2, no. 18.
49. The quote comes from Jeremy Bransten, “Russia: Corruption
Continues To Thrive, Say Researchers,” RFE/RL Report, Prague,
4 June 2002.
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analysts have cautiously begun to say that Russia 
has moved from a developing to a developed market 
economy. The country is now poised to enter a stage 
of economic development in which respecting minor 
shareholders’ rights and maintaining transparency 
standards are deemed to be useful. This belief is 
reflected in the recent U.S. decision to certify Russia 
as a market economy, a move seen as a step forward 
in Russia's quest to join the World Trade 
Organization.50 The leaders of the G-7 countries 
decided to upgrade Russia's status to full 
membership in the group by 2006. In addition, 
Russia will host a special meeting of G-8 members 
in 2004, and the 2006 G-8 summit will be held in St. 
Petersburg.51 On the domestic front, new legal codes 
on taxation, land, and inheritance rights also have 
been signed into law. Combined with the late 2001 
reforms of the judicial system, Russia appears to be 
taking some of the constructive, pro-business steps 
that Boris Yeltsin was either unable or unwilling to 
embrace.
Of course, if there is one thing that capitalism 
has shown, it is that what is good for “business” is 
not necessarily good for the general population. 
Market democracy, in the view of many Russians, 
replaced a restrictive, egalitarian order with 
widespread poverty, rampant crime, unemployment, 
an overwhelmed health-care system, and 
environmental pollution. While this assessment 
might not be entirely accurate, perceptions are 
important since acceptance and faith in the socio-
political order are key elements in societal stability. 
Judith Shapiro’s chapter on health and healthcare 
policies in Russia argues that much of what was 
done (or not done) in the late Soviet period is 
responsible for much of the current health crisis in 
Russia.52 However, it is the period and policies of 
the Yeltsin-era shock therapists that still receive 
most of the blame for Russia’s social and economic 
woes.
The economic and social upheaval that has 
characterized the years following Communism's 
collapse in the former Soviet bloc is evident in 
nearly every aspect of life, perhaps most keenly felt 
in declining health care across the post-Soviet
50. RFE/RL Report, “Russia: Market Economy Recognized by 
US,” Moscow, 7 June 2002.
51. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, voi. 6, no. 120, part 1, 27 June 2002.
52. Judith Shapiro, “Health and Health care Policy,” in White, 
Pravda, and Gitelman, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 5, 
pp. 205-212.
spectrum.53 Child mortality is two to three times 
higher in Russia than in Western European 
countries, and Russian mortality figures overall are 
at the highest levels since World War II. The World 
Health Organization estimates that Russia now 
spends $251 per person per year on healthcare, 
compared with almost $1,700 per person per year in 
the European Union. Russia ranks 130th in the world 
for overall health system performance.54 It is 
estimated that 700,000 abandoned children cram the 
woefully inadequate orphanage system, more than 
the number in the entire Soviet Union after the 
Second World War.55 A truly disturbing fact is that 
most Russians living below the poverty line are 
actually employed, which is not the case in Western 
countries.56
Whether or not responsibility for the continued 
social crises plaguing Russia will be attributed to 
President Putin, who has thus far avoided blame for 
the poor state of Russian society, is another 
intriguing question. Perhaps the answer will be 
discerned through the ballot boxes when Putin 
comes up for re-election. However, as Christopher 
Marsh makes clear, “the success of democracy does 
not simply depend on whether elections are held 
according to schedule.”57 This general theme is 
explored in greater depth in the various chapters of 
the Marsh and Gvosdev volume, Civil Society and 
the Search for Justice in Russia. The authors of the 
volume examine diverse aspects and issue areas 
related to the role of civil society in contemporary 
Russia, including chapters on the experience of 
women, the marginalized voices of ethnic minorities, 
and the notion of “managed pluralism” and religion. 
After acknowledging the need of a substantial role of 
civil society for a democratic system to operate, the 
authors discuss whether Russian civil society is up to 
the tremendous task it faces. For example, one 
avenue of civil society, the NGO sector, provides 
some reason for encouragement. It has developed 
substantially over the past decade, such that in 
November 2001 the government organized a Civic 
Forum in an effort to manage the 300,000
53. Alexandra Poolos, “East: Taking The Pulse Of Post-Soviet 
Health Care (Part 1),” RFE/RL Report, Prague, 22 March 2002.
54. Kathleen Knox, “Russia: Unhealthy Mothers in Russia Get 
Babies off to a Poor Start (Part 4),” RFE/RL Report, Prague, 22 
March 2002.
55. Mike Thompson, Detroit Free Press, 23 November 2001.
56. Trud-7, 26 July 2001.
57. Christopher Marsh, Russia at the Polls, p. 147.
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nongovernmental organizations registered with the 
Justice Ministry. Meeting for two days in the 
Kremlin State Palace in Moscow, Civic Forum 
gathered together 5,000 activists from NGOs across 
Russia. President Putin addressed the gathering on 
its first day, assuring delegates that civil society 
could not be formed at the initiative of the 
government. To some, government attempts to co-
opt civil society give rise to the fear that the 
government aimed to create surrogate, parallel 
structures of its own to compete with any 
independent social organizations.58
How much of Russia’s democratization efforts 
are legitimate, and how much of it is simply 
window-dressing, is an incredibly important avenue 
of inquiry, as Russia’s path to democratization (or 
even the desire to proceed in that direction) is not yet 
assured. Zvi Gitelman’s concluding chapter for 
Developments in Russian Politics strikes a cautious 
(and I believe astute) note by suggesting that there is 
no reason to assume either the inevitability or 
impossibility of a democratic Russia. He posits that 
Russian democratization efforts have been halted at 
the creation stage, a development (or rather, lack of 
development) that he attributes in great part “to the 
contradictory nature of Yeltsin’s impulses,” as well 
as to the fact that neither Yeltsin nor Putin “has even 
tried to form an institutionalized constituency for 
democracy.59
So, where does this leave us, or rather, where 
does this leave Russia? In part, we can agree with 
Gordon Smith, that “the transition from communism 
experienced in Russia, rather than expanding the 
state’s capacity to make and implement policy, has 
resulted in the creation of political vacuums, 
institutional malaise, chaos, and lawlessness.”60 A 
harsh assessment, but not far off the mark, 
particularly if one uses Western democracies as the 
benchmark. But while utilizing external models and 
conceptions might best capture Russia’s movement 
toward becoming a “Western power,” it might not be 
the best method of gauging the political, economic 
and social aspirations of the citizens of the Russian 
Federation. In fact, most Russians (oligarchic elite 
and new Russians excluded) reject the imperialistic
arrogance' of “democratic values,” the anti-
intellectual proclivities of Western mass culture 
(such as is reflected in mainstream television and 
films), and the soulless worship of acquisition that 
seems to drive the Western societies.
Consequently, conceptions of what a modem 
democratic order should look like, especially in 
terms of social justice and true freedom (which 
includes economic rights as well as voting rights), 
must be worked out within and among the peoples of 
the Russian Federation, not imported from (or 
foisted upon them) militarily superior allies, 
regardless of how well-meaning or self-assured 
those new friends might be. Slavic communalism, 
Soviet egalitarianism, not to mention many centuries 
of Russian culture and values, will likely form the 
basis of Russian society in the new millenium. This 
is as it should be. The authors reviewed here have 
employed a wide array of methods, concepts, 
theories and approaches to analyze the myriad 
aspects of contemporary society, providing great 
insight into the democratic development of the 
West’s newfound partner and erstwhile ally. They 
tell us a great deal about where Russia is, and how 
things reached the point that they have. But as 
Christopher Marsh points out in Russia at the Polls, 
“more than a decade of democratic reforms has 
made abundantly clear, Russia’s history is far from 
over.”61
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